NNSquad - Network Neutrality Squad
NNSquad Home Page
NNSquad Mailing List Information
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
[ NNSquad ] Fear mongering and trolls (Re: Keith Dawson: uTorrent Responds Regarding UDP Usage)
- To: nnsquad@nnsquad.org
- Subject: [ NNSquad ] Fear mongering and trolls (Re: Keith Dawson: uTorrent Responds Regarding UDP Usage)
- From: "David P. Reed" <dpreed@reed.com>
- Date: Tue, 02 Dec 2008 12:43:29 -0500
There has been huge confusion appearing on this list regarding UDP. The
view that UDP = danger has been expressed.
This is incorrect, and seriously counter productive, especially if these
arguments are presented to policy makers.
I will keep this brief, but am willing to expand on these points if
necessary.
1) UDP is not "dangerous". It is a well-understood standard, and
requires only a little care in use to do things that *are not possible*
using TCP. As an example, the dominant VoIP standard, SIP, uses UDP (as
the transport for RTP), so if we were to ban UDP, it would break VoIP as
well! Similarly, streaming video standards use UDP.
2) If there is an issue at all, it is that BitTorrent might not "back
off" when congestion occurs in some downstream router. That's not a
good way to design BitTorrent, because it will make BitTorrent work
*worse*, by forcing the routers that get congested to discard the
BitTorrent packets themselves.
I have some confidence that BitTorrent and uTorrent guys actually know
how to implement protocols that work - I know the inventor of
BitTorrent, and he is quite savvy, and has shown a great deal of
interest in making protocols that "behave". If they do not work (and
there is a technical measure of this, well known in the congestion
control community) then they can be fixed.
3) The Internet has shown itself to be pretty robust, all things
considered. Many fear-mongers (starting with Bob Metcalfe) have claimed
that it will all come crashing down. It has not. It hasn't even come
close, though some people like to tell just-so stories about one or
another large-scale problem. The proper response to a problem is to
measure it, understand it, and fix it.
Here's my advice: Don't listen to fear-mongers. Ask for data that shows
evidence for their claims. Take a deep breath. Evaluate the risk, and
take a measured response. Don't buy gear from fear-mongering
salespeople with kludges like "RST injection" or Deep Packet Inspection.
[ For readers who are unfamiliar with David, he *created* UDP, so
he knows of what he speaks. David also makes another important
point -- when there are problems, the proper course is to fix
them. Brett suggested that years ago I postulated an "Internet
Meltdown." What he's actually referring to is a PFIR
conference I held aimed at finding specific solutions to
*prevent* the meltdown of the Internet. And so far we have
collectively succeeded. But many of the same risks do remain,
if changed in form -- and new risks have since appeared,
especially commercial and policy-related, rather than strictly
technical. There's continuing work to do -- that's part of
what this list is about.
It's similar in a way to the situation we had around Y2K. If
steps hadn't been taken proactively to fix what needed to be
changed, there could have been some serious problems (though
civilization wasn't going to collapse from Y2K failures in any
case). But we did what needed to be done, and actual Y2K
problem events were comparatively limited in number and
severity.
In the case of Y2K though, we were mainly dealing with technical
changes. With the Internet, the intersection of technology and
policy with commercial interests makes for a considerably
more complex situation. But we can succeed, if we have
(as Dr. Strangelove would say) the will to do so!
-- Lauren Weinstein
NNSquad Moderator ]