NNSquad - Network Neutrality Squad
[ NNSquad ] Re: New P2P Privacy System from Univ. of Washington
So here we are with the debate on DPI.
DPI is good when we use it to:
* Inspect content to detect and block virus or malware signatures
* Inspect content to detect and block denial of service payloads
* Inspect content to detect and block spam
* Inspect content to detect replicate data to cache data so that unicast
audio/video delivery scales
* Inspect explicit DiffServ labels to properly prioritize traffic
* Inspect protocol headers to determine implicit prioritization label in the
absence of explicit priority labels
* Inspect content to offer targeted advertising to pay for free wireless
broadband
* Inspect content to offer targeted advertising to pay for free cloud email
e.g., Gmail
* Inspect content to offer targeted advertising when user explicitly agrees
to terms and conditions
DPI is bad when we use it to:
* Inspect content to offer targeted advertising to users without disclosure
or permission from user
George Ou
[ I don't know whose set of good/bad values that's supposed to be.
You? Verizon? Eric Schmidt? Rush Limbaugh? Wendy Carlos?
It's certainly not mine.
-- Lauren Weinstein
NNSquad Moderator ]
-----Original Message-----
From: nnsquad-bounces+george_ou=lanarchitect.net@nnsquad.org
[mailto:nnsquad-bounces+george_ou=lanarchitect.net@nnsquad.org] On Behalf Of
Lauren Weinstein
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2009 6:02 PM
To: Richard Bennett
Cc: nnsquad@nnsquad.org; Paul Forbes
Subject: [ NNSquad ] Re: New P2P Privacy System from Univ. of Washington
On 02/24 14:15, Richard Bennett wrote:
> I think there's a big difference between technologies that can be
> "abused by evil people" and those that are *meant to be used by
> criminals in the commission of crime*. There's no legitimate reason to
> mask the identities of the members of a P2P swarm in any free and
> democratic country, and no chance of doing so anywhere else.
This is a remarkable statement. I assume Richard means it in the
context of illicit use -- but of course what is meant by "illicit"
varies widely. In some countries, negative comments about the
leadership can get you thrown into a dungeon or your brains blown out
by government edict, courtesy of a bullet to the base of your skull.
But we know that all use of P2P is not illicit by most definitions,
and the percentage of illicit material in overall P2P usage is
(according to the figures I've seen) dropping at a significant rate.
For those of us who still believe in the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution (obviously an ever smaller cult), the concept of
anonymity is important, since around that revolves much of the entire
problem of unreasonable search and seizure, and the related protection
of legal activities.
> This Washington U. stuff is just garbage.
I'm sure the U. of W. team appreciates your respectful technical
analysis of their efforts, Richard.
> Are we doomed to transmitting a unique copy of
> the entire packet stream of each episode of "American Idol" to each of
> its 50 million viewers, or can we relax the layering dogma enough to
> cache copies of the stream close to the end user?
Bullpucky. That's a completely specious argument, and you know your
technology well enough to realize that. So do most people reading this
list, I'll wager.
> Solving this problem will require some awareness of the content by the
> delivery system, and that's not a bad thing, is it? According to
> neutralist dogma, it's the Original Sin. So the choice appears to be
> this: efficient networks or neutral networks, pick only one.
No, the real choice is being honest about technological realities, vs.
psuedo-political spins leading us toward technology's inner circle
of hell.
There are a multitude of topologies that would well serve mass
distribution of media content over the Internet that could be deployed
without creating the kind of anticompetive, inappropriately skewed and
limited frameworks that have become the center of the current
neutrality debate. The question is whether or not these topologies
can be economically and effectively deployed given the existing
warped, largely unreglated Internet telecom landscape that we must
build upon to move forward.
--Lauren--
NNSquad Moderator