NNSquad - Network Neutrality Squad
[ NNSquad ] [IP] Seymour Hersh: The Online Threat -- Should we be worried about a cyber war?
----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave@farber.net> ----- Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2010 07:52:41 -0400 From: David Farber <dave@farber.net> Subject: [IP] Seymour Hersh: The Online Threat -- Should we be worried about a cyber war? Reply-To: dave@farber.net To: ip <ip@listbox.com> F53612D8-E0FE-11DF-834B-9028F7012DEA: Begin forwarded message: From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne@warpspeed.com> Date: October 25, 2010 1:42:30 PM EDT To: Multiple recipients of Dewayne-Net <dewayne-net@warpspeed.com> Subject: [Dewayne-Net] Seymour Hersh: The Online Threat -- Should we be worried about a cyber war? Reply-To: dewayne-net@warpspeed.com [Note: This item comes from friend John McMullen. DLH] From: "John F. McMullen" <johnmac13@gmail.com> Date: October 25, 2010 9:15:50 AM PDT To: "John F. McMullen" <johnmacsgroup@yahoogroups.com> Cc: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne@warpspeed.com>, Commonweal Mailing List <commonweal@yahoogroups.com>, Dave Farber <dave@farber.net> Subject: Seymour Hersh: The Online Threat -- Should we be worried about a cyber war? >From the New Yorker -- <http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/11/01/101101fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all> The Online Threat Should we be worried about a cyber war? by Seymour M. Hersh November 1, 2010 Some experts say that the real danger lies in confusing cyber espionage with cyber war. On April 1, 2001, an American EP-3E Aries II reconnaissance plane on an eavesdropping mission collided with a Chinese interceptor jet over the South China Sea, triggering the first international crisis of George W. Bush’s Administration. The Chinese jet crashed, and its pilot was killed, but the pilot of the American aircraft, Navy Lieutenant Shane Osborn, managed to make an emergency landing at a Chinese F-8 fighter base on Hainan Island, fifteen miles from the mainland. Osborn later published a memoir, in which he described the “incessant jackhammer vibration” as the plane fell eight thousand feet in thirty seconds, before he regained control. The plane carried twenty-four officers and enlisted men and women attached to the Naval Security Group Command, a field component of the National Security Agency. They were repatriated after eleven days; the plane stayed behind. The Pentagon told the press that the crew had followed its protocol, which called for the use of a fire axe, and even hot coffee, to disable the plane’s equipment and software. These included an operating system created and controlled by the N.S.A., and the drivers needed to monitor encrypted Chinese radar, voice, and electronic communications. It was more than two years before the Navy acknowledged that things had not gone so well. “Compromise by the People’s Republic of China of undestroyed classified material . . . is highly probable and cannot be ruled out,” a Navy report issued in September, 2003, said. The loss was even more devastating than the 2003 report suggested, and its dimensions have still not been fully revealed. Retired Rear Admiral Eric McVadon, who flew patrols off the coast of Russia and served as a defense attaché in Beijing, told me that the radio reports from the aircraft indicated that essential electronic gear had been dealt with. He said that the crew of the EP-3E managed to erase the hard drive—“zeroed it out”—but did not destroy the hardware, which left data retrievable: “No one took a hammer.” Worse, the electronics had recently been upgraded. “Some might think it would not turn out as badly as it did, but I sat in some meetings about the intelligence cost,” McVadon said. “It was grim.” The Navy’s experts didn’t believe that China was capable of reverse-engineering the plane’s N.S.A.-supplied operating system, estimated at between thirty and fifty million lines of computer code, according to a former senior intelligence official. Mastering it would give China a road map for decrypting the Navy’s classified intelligence and operational data. “If the operating system was controlling what you’d expect on an intelligence aircraft, it would have a bunch of drivers to capture radar and telemetry,” Whitfield Diffie, a pioneer in the field of encryption, said. “The plane was configured for what it wants to snoop, and the Chinese would want to know what we wanted to know about them—what we could intercept and they could not.” And over the next few years the U.S. intelligence community began to “read the tells” that China had access to sensitive traffic. The U.S. realized the extent of its exposure only in late 2008. A few weeks after Barack Obama’s election, the Chinese began flooding a group of communications links known to be monitored by the N.S.A. with a barrage of intercepts, two Bush Administration national-security officials and the former senior intelligence official told me. The intercepts included details of planned American naval movements. The Chinese were apparently showing the U.S. their hand. (“The N.S.A. would ask, ‘Can the Chinese be that good?’ ” the former official told me. “My response was that they only invented gunpowder in the tenth century and built the bomb in 1965. I’d say, ‘Can you read Chinese?’ We don’t even know the Chinese pictograph for ‘Happy hour.’ ”) Why would the Chinese reveal that they had access to American communications? One of the Bush national-security officials told me that some of the aides then working for Vice-President Dick Cheney believed—or wanted to believe—that the barrage was meant as a welcome to President Obama. It is also possible that the Chinese simply made a mistake, given the difficulty of operating surgically in the cyber world. Admiral Timothy J. Keating, who was then the head of the Pacific Command, convened a series of frantic meetings in Hawaii, according to a former C.I.A. official. In early 2009, Keating brought the issue to the new Obama Administration. If China had reverse-engineered the EP-3E’s operating system, all such systems in the Navy would have to be replaced, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. After much discussion, several current and former officials said, this was done. (The Navy did not respond to a request for comment on the incident.) Admiral McVadon said that the loss prompted some black humor, with one Navy program officer quoted as saying, “This is one hell of a way to go about getting a new operating system.” The EP-3E debacle fuelled a longstanding debate within the military and in the Obama Administration. Many military leaders view the Chinese penetration as a warning about present and future vulnerabilities—about the possibility that China, or some other nation, could use its expanding cyber skills to attack America’s civilian infrastructure and military complex. On the other side are those who argue for a civilian response to the threat, focussed on a wider use of encryption. They fear that an overreliance on the military will have adverse consequences for privacy and civil liberties. In May, after years of planning, the U.S. Cyber Command was officially activated, and took operational control of disparate cyber-security and attack units that had been scattered among the four military services. Its commander, Army General Keith Alexander, a career intelligence officer, has made it clear that he wants more access to e-mail, social networks, and the Internet to protect America and fight in what he sees as a new warfare domain—cyberspace. In the next few months, President Obama, who has publicly pledged that his Administration will protect openness and privacy on the Internet, will have to make choices that will have enormous consequences for the future of an ever-growing maze of new communication techniques: Will America’s networks be entrusted to civilians or to the military? Will cyber security be treated as a kind of war? Even as the full story of China’s EP-3E coup remained hidden, “cyber war” was emerging as one of the nation’s most widely publicized national-security concerns. Early this year, Richard Clarke, a former White House national-security aide who warned about the threat from Al Qaeda before the September 11th attacks, published “Cyber War,” an edgy account of America’s vulnerability to hackers, both state-sponsored and individual, especially from China. “Since the late 1990s, China has systematically done all the things a nation would do if it contemplated having an offensive cyber war capability,” Clarke wrote. He forecast a world in which China might unleash havoc: [snip] Dewayne-Net RSS Feed: <http://www.warpspeed.com/wordpress> ------------------------------------------- Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/125750-544611b7 Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=125750&id_secret=125750-5bb6cf56 Unsubscribe Now: https://www.listbox.com/unsubscribe/?member_id=125750&id_secret=125750-6876700a Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message -----